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*

INTRODUCTION

Actions alleging an accountant's professional malpractice frequently present intriguing issues of fact and law. These include the
existence of a duty to the claimant, the standard of care owed, proximate cause, and damages. Perhaps the most interesting issue presented by accountant's malpractice cases is the availability of the
defense of contributory or, depending upon the jurisdiction, comparative negligence.' This issue is one which courts from other jurisdictions
have considered with at least ostensibly varying results, using disparate reasoning to reach those results. 2 Moreover, although the commentators have answered the question uniformly, they too have adopted
varied rationale. There are only two reported New Jersey decisions
arising from accountant's malpractice cases. 3 Neither reported New
Jersey case deals with the issue of contributory negligence.The intent
of this Article, therefore, is to address the availability of the defense of
contributory negligence in malpractice claims against accountants
* A.B., University of Notre Dame; J.D., New York University; Partner, Stryker, Tams &
Dill, Newark, New Jersey.
I As used hereafter, "contributory negligence" includes comparative negligence as adopted
in New Jersey by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-5.1 to -5.3 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983). Under
New Jersey law, no distinction is made between the defenses of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk. Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959).
Accordingly, as used hereafter, contributory negligence also includes assumption of risk.
2 CompareCraig v. Anyon, 212 A.D. 55, 208 N.Y.S. 259 (App. Div. 1925), af'd, 242 N.Y.
569, 152 N.E. 431 (1926) (contributory negligence defense successful in suit by client against
accountant) with Shapiro v. Glekel, 380 F. Supp. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) and National Sur. Corp.
v. Lybrand, 256 A.D. 226, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1939) (contributory negligence not accepted carte
blanche as defense against accountant).
3 H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 183 N.J. Super. 417, 444 A.2d 66 (App. Div. 1982), is the
most recently reported New Jersey decision that deals with accountant's malpractice. Rosenblum
involved an action brought to determine if an accountant owed a duty of care to a company that
merges with another company, the latter which had an audit prepared by the accountant. Id. at
418, 444 A.2d at 66. The trial court entered an order for partial summary judgment against the
company that later merged with the accountant's client on the ground of lack of privity. Id. at
420, 444 A.2d at 67. The appellate division affirmed, holding that accountants are not liable to
unforeseeable parties. Id. at 424, 444 A.2d at 70. Since no merger was contemplated at the time
of the audit, the accountants owed no duty of care to the company that later merged with the
defendant's client. Id. at 423-24, 444 A.2d at 70. Stern v. Abramson, 150 N.J. Super. 571, 376
A.2d 221 (Law Div. 1977), is the only other reported accountant's malpractice case in New
Jersey. Abramson, however, addressed the discoverability of accountant's financial circum-

stances where punitive damages are claimed.
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and, drawing upon New Jersey authorities arising from unrelated
contexts, suggest how the issue may be treated when presented to a
court applying New Jersey law.
A review of the limited number of cases which have considered to
any degree the availability of the defense of contributory negligence in
accountant's malpractice actions indicates that the defense has been
raised in only two types of cases. 4 In one variety, the client contends
that the accountant is liable for failing to discover acts of fraud by the
client's employee against the client. 5 In this type of case, the defense of
contributory negligence arises when the accountant asserts either that
the client was itself negligent in not detecting the employee's fraud or
in so conducting its business, the client has made the employee's fraud
possible. In the second variety, the client contends that the accountant
is liable for erroneously reporting its financial condition and that the
client, as a result of the accountant's erroneous advice, enters into a
course of activity which results in its financial loss. 6 In this type of case
the defense of contributory negligence arises when the accountant
asserts that the client was itself at fault in conducting its business in a
fashion which resulted in the loss.
In both types of cases, the cause of action may be based upon one
or more of several theories. These include breach of contract, negligence, or misrepresentation. While earlier authorities placed some
significance on the theory of the cause of action, 7 as might be expected, more recent authorities do not recognize the cause of action
8
theory as being determinative.
II.

ANALYSIS

1. Development of Standards
The availability of the defense of contributory negligence in an
accountant's malpractice action was first discussed in Craig v.
Anyon.2 The client in that case, a securities broker, alleged that the
4 See generally Hawkins, ProfessionalNegligence Liability of PublicAccountants, 12 VAND.
L. REv. 797, 798 (1959); D. CAUSEY, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THE CPA 125-56 (rev. ed. 1976).
s E.g., Craig v. Anyon, 212 A.D. 55, 208 N.Y.S. 259 (App. Div. 1925), aff'd, 242 N.Y. 569,
152 N.E. 431 (1926).
' See Shapiro v. Glekel, 380 F. Supp. 1053, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
' Hawkins, supra note 4, at 800 n. 16. There, Professor Hawkins notes that the earlier cases

limited liability by requiring a breach of contract action. Id. at 800. If the action were for breach
of contract, there would "be a more restricted rule as to remoteness of damage." Id.
I See, e.g., Shapiro v. Glekel, 380 F. Supp. 1053, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (court implies
action can be either in tort or contract); 5 A. CoeRIN, CONTRACTS § 1019, at 113-24 & n.59
(1951).
9 212 A.D. 55, 208 N.Y.S. 259 (App. Div. 1925), aff'd, 242 N.Y. 569, 152 N.E. 431 (1926).
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accountants, whom plaintiff had engaged to audit its books were
liable for damages caused as a result of defendants' failure to discover
defalcations by Moore, the plaintiff's commodities department manager. 10 The client contended that the failure constituted a breach of
contract and negligence in performing the contract. 1 The accountants asserted as defenses both the negligence of the plaintiff and the
negligence and criminal acts of the plaintiffs employees. 12 The jury,
answering special interrogatories, found that the accountants were
negligent and awarded a verdict compensating the plaintiff for the
amount of the thefts. 1 3 The trial court rejected defendants' motion to
set aside the finding of negligence and entered a judgment for the
plaintiff, but only for the amount that the accountants had charged
the plaintiff for their services.1 4 Both parties appealed and the appel5
late division affirmed. '
Although the appellate division had no difficulty finding that the
accountants were careless and that a properly conducted audit would
have uncovered the loss," these findings were not dispositive of the
appeal. There were, noted the court, "a number of other elements
entering into this case, which show[ed] that the plaintiffs [were] not
without blame and might have avoided the loss."1 7 To the court, it
seemed unreasonable to charge the accountants, misled by the dishon10Id. at 56, 208 N.Y.S. at 260. Moore was permitted absolute control over one of plaintiff's
commodity accounts without supervision by his superiors. Id. at 57, 208 N.Y.S. at 262.
1Id. at 56, 208 N.Y.S. at 261.
12 Id. at 57, 208 N.Y.S. at 262.
13 Id. at 56, 208 N.Y.S. at 261. The jury was required to answer two questions: (1) Were the
accountants negligent in performing the contract with the plaintiff? and (2) If the defendants
were negligent, what was the direct and proximate amount of damage to the plaintiff? Id. The
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $1,177,805.26, representing the
plaintiff's proven loss. Id.
4 The court found "as a matter of law [that the defendants' fee of $2000 was] the only loss
which resulted directly and proximately from [the] negligence of the defendants." Id.
i5 Id. at 64, 208 N.Y.S. at 269.
" Basically, the audit function consists of an examination of the financial records of an
entity. That leads to a collection of data, the formulation of a conclusion based on the data, and
the presentation of that judgment in a report on the financial statements. Hawkins, supra note 4,
at 803 (quoting COMMITTEE ON AUDITING PROCEDURE, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS,
GENERALLY ACCEPTED AUDITING STANDARDS-THEIR SIGNIFICANCE AND SCOPE 13-14 (1954)); see
Fiflis, CurrentProblems of Accountants' Responsibilities to Third Parties,28 VAND. L. REV. 31,
35-36 (1975).
Much has been written on the procedures and standards to be followed by accountants. See,
e.g., id. at 41; McGuire, Report of the Miscellaneous MalpracticeCommittee, 47 INS. COUNS. J.
32 (1980). For a comprehensive comment on auditing standards and auditing procedures, see P.
GRADY, INVENTORY OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING

PRINCIPLES FOR BUSINESS ENTERPRISES

47-54 (1965); Savage, New Teeth for the Watchdog, 1980 J. Bus. L. 393, 396-403; Winters,
Avoiding Malpractice Liability Suits, 152 J. ACCOUNTANCY 69 (1981).
17 212 A.D. at 57, 208 N.Y.S. at 262.
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esty of the employee under the plaintiff's supervision, with liability.' 8
In matters involving the commodities department, the accountants
dealt only with Moore. They had no reason to question his honesty,
for he was acting as the firm's exclusive representative. Further, it was
he who supplied defendants with the information upon which they
relied.' 9 If the defendants relied on Moore's honesty, the court held,
they did so to no greater extent than did the plaintiff. 20 Indeed, the
court found that given the discretion accorded Moore, the client relied
2
upon Moore to "an extent beyond all reason." '
While a proper accounting may have disclosed Moore's dishonesty, proper supervision by the plaintiff's management would also
have disclosed the loss. In particular, the court noted that the broker
never examined transactions in its most actively traded account which
Moore used for his scheme. 22 Further, against the written advice of
the accountants, the broker placed a certain ledger under Moore's
control, thus giving Moore command of all financial materials necessary to operate his scheme. 23 With respect to the client's responsibility
for the loss, the court concluded that the plaintiff "could have prevented the loss by the exercise of reasonable care and that they should
not have relied exclusively on the accountants." 24 The court also
intimated that the chain of causation was broken by the intervening
criminal act of the client's employee which could not be reasonably
25
foreseen by the defendants.
The dissent in Craig relied upon a broad principle which would
later be adopted by other authorities. The dissent opined that assuming the plaintiff was negligent in failing to discover the embezzlement
and falsification, the defendants' failure to properly perform their
contract failed to save plaintiffs from their own negligence, which was
the very reason that the parties entered into the contract. 26 Accordingly, the dissent would have reinstated the jury's verdict.
Commentators were quick to criticize the result and rationale of
Craig. The first published comment questioned the court's reasons for
27
treating the case as one in negligence rather than one in contract.
" Id.; see supra note 10.
19Id. at 58, 208 N.Y.S. at 263. But cf. Hawkins, supra note 4, at 802-06 (cautioning
accountants to exercise care in relying upon representations of client's employees).
20 212 A.D. at 58, 208 N.Y.S. at 263.
21
1Id. at 61, 208 N.Y.S. at 266.
22 Id., 208 N.Y.S. at 267.
23 Id. at 61, 208 N.Y.S. at 266-67.
24 Id. at 62, 208 N.Y.S. at 268.
25 Id. at 62-63, 208 N.Y.S. at 268-69.
28 Id. at 63, 208 N.Y.S. at 269-70 (Clarke, J., dissenting).
27 Comment, The Legal Responsibility of Public Accountants, 35 YALE L.J. 76, 78 (1925).
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The commentator deemed it preferable to consider a case such as
Craig as one for breach of contract thus stressing the element of
reliance by the promisee on the promisor's agreement to perform for,
"after contract, the promisee should be, and is, entitled to put the
matter from his mind unless and until he is appraised that there is no
intention to perform.1 28 In that context, the client's suspicion of a fact
collateral to the accountant's default (i.e., employee fraud) should not
bar recovery unless there are suspicious circumstances indicating that
the accountant did not perform. Under the latter condition, the client
29
would have the duty to mitigate.
Although this criticism was technical and grounded on the theory
of the cause of action, 30 a much broader policy based primarily upon
practicality was also expressed. 3 1 The requirements of modern business dictate that there be a delegation of authority by employer to
employee. In this delegation there is inherent danger. As a check on
this peril, the business community began to hire public accountants to
audit its books. 32 For the check to have value, the business community
must be legally safe in relying on it. Given specialization and division
of labor, the businessman must be able to depend on the undertakings
of others. Responsibility, therefore, ought to be placed on the accountant-the party who has the economic function and is in the best
position to fend off the harm. The accountant's proper performance of
his duties protects both the accountant and the businessman from
lOSS. 33

The commentator noted that each report by the accountants
"constituted an assurance that" the client's reliance upon the employee was not misplaced. 34 The criminal acts of the employee did not
constitute an intervening cause, because they were or should have
been anticipated by the defendants-"they were the very thing the
contract was made to detect and prevent. ' 35 Consequently, it was
suggested that use of the doctrine of contributory negligence, in the

21 Id. at 80.
29 Id.
30 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
31 Comment, supra note 27, at 82-83.
32

Id. at 83. The accounting profession has grown in response to the public's needs and

concerns. D. CAUSEY, supra note 4, at 3; see also Adams, Lessening the Legal Liability of
Auditors, 32 Bus. LAW. 1037, 1039 (1977).
33 Comment, supra note 27, at 81-83; see also Rouse, Legal Liability of the Public Accountant, 23 Ky. L.J. 1, 41 (1934); Comment, Accountants'Liability, 13 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 310, 313
(1939) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Accountants' Liability].
31 Comment, supra note 27, at 83.
35 Id.

1983]

ACCOUNTANT'S MALPRACTICE

sense of active vigilance by the client, was undesirable. 36 Even if
under the circumstances, the client had reason to be suspicious of his
employee's dishonesty and had failed to act, the client's conduct
37
should be viewed in the context of the accountant's assurances.
Craig was also criticized by Professor Rouse 38 who found that its
result was inconsistent with the realities of modern business. 3 He
found it "absurd to say that unless the businessman performs the
function which he employs the accountant to perform, he cannot
recover from the accountant for misfeasance. ' 40 Although the commentator accepted in theory that contributory negligence might be a
defense under appropriate circumstances in accountant's malpractice
actions, those cases would be extremely rare. 41 Though not entirely
clear, it seems that the commentator would recognize the defense
where the client was in the position to know that the accountant's
42
work was not done properly but nevertheless placed reliance on it.
Craig was cited with approval in a Canadian case, International
Laboratories, Ltd. v. Dewar43 which, like its American predecessor,
presented a claim by the client that the accountants were negligent in
not discovering thefts by the client's employee. The accountants, like
the defendants in Craig, contended that the losses were caused by the
client's negligence. The allegedly negligent acts by the client included:
signing the checks for the employee without inquiring into the purpose
of withdrawing funds; 44 failing to heed the accountants' advice to
maintain a small balance in the petty cash account; 45 and failing to
11 Id. at 83-84. Of course, an accountant may not be held responsible for defalcations if the
accountant has followed accepted accounting practices. See, e.g., Rouse, supra note 33, at 15-16;
Comment, Accountants' Liability, supra note 33, at 313.
31 Comment, supra note 27, at 84-85.
38 See Rouse, supra note 33.
31 Id. at 39, 41.
40 Id. at 41.
41

Id. at 42.

42 Id. at 39-40. That position seems to have support from other commentators, most notably

Professor Hawkins. See Hawkins, supra note 4, at 811.
43 [1933] 3 D.L.R. 665, 41 Man. 329.
44 Id. at 667, 41 Man. at 332. The dishonest employee's scheme was to deposit a legitimate
check from a customer in the bank without entering the amount in the cash column of plaintiffs'
books. Id. Then he would write a check for the same amount to a fictitious creditor. The
employee would also have the bank enter the letters "CC" on the check, to signify a certified
check. Id. The client's officers would indorse the check and the employee would then use the
check for his personal expenses. Id. After the employee received the certified check, he would
change the letters from "CC" to "EC". Id. The latter designation meant "error corrected," and it
would be entered in the customer's account. Id. These actions caused the two entries to apparently neutralize each other. Id.
11 Id. at 670, 41 Man. at 334. It should be noted, though, that the accountants made the
suggestion every other year for six years but they made no further attempts to have the amount in
petty cash reduced. Id.
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operate the petty cash account on a specified accounting basis. 46 One
member of the court adopted the view, representative of the court
generally, that it is the client's responsibility-not the accountants'to look after the business and to insure that it gets paid for what it
sells, and does not pay for purchases not received. 47 Citing Craig, the
justice stated that the plaintiff cannot recover for losses to which it
48
contributed by its own negligence.
Craig was obliquely rejected by another New York court in
National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand.49 In National Surety, the plaintiff
was defrauded by an employee who embezzled from petty cash and
covered the thefts by "kiting" checks.5 0 The plaintiff contended that
the accountants were liable for not uncovering the thefts.,' The accountants were charged with failure to properly perform their contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and fraudulent misrepresentation. 52 The defendants asserted that the loss was caused by the
contributory negligence of the client in not recognizing discrepancies
in certain records, preparing certain memoranda in pencil thus making them easy to alter, and carelessly conducting the plaintiff's bookkeeping department. 53 The trial court ruled that plaintiff failed to
establish a primafacie case. 54 The appellate division reversed, finding
that there was evidence from which the jury could have found a

41 Id. at 666, 41 Man. at 338. The defendants urged the plaintiffs to adopt an imprest system.
Id. That technique simply requires that a cash account be replenished in exactly the amount
expended. H. BIERMAN, JR. & A. DREBIN, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: AN INTRODUCTION 137-39 (3d
ed. 1978).
41 3 D.L.R. at 675-76, 41 Man. at 332.
41 Id. at 681, 41 Man. at 346.
One member of the Canadian court had difficulty finding that the failure to detect a loss
during the audit was the proximate cause of losses after that audit, as the chain of causation was
broken by the employee's criminal acts. Id. at 704-06, 41 Man. at 366-68 (Robson, J., concurring).
49 256 A.D. 226, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554 (App. Div. 1939).
Id. at 229, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 557. "Kiting" has been defined as:
Writing a check on the company's account in one bank and depositing it in the
company's account in another bank. Because the bank on which the check is drawn
will not reduce the company's account until the check clears through the banking
system, the two banks combined will temporarily show a higher balance for the
company than the total deposits actually owned.
H. BIERMAN, JR. & A. DREBIN, supro note 46, at 136. Additionally, it has been defined as,
"writing checks against bank accounts where funds are insufficient to cover them, hoping that
before they are presented the necessary funds will be deposited." Sutro Bros. & Co. v. Indemnity
Ins. Co. of North America, 264 F. Supp. 273, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (quoting L. WYCOFF,
DICTIONARY OF STOCK MARKET TERMs 268 (1964)).
11 256 A.D. at 227, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
52 Id. at 228-29, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 557.
53 Id. at 230, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 557-58.
54 Id. at 229, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
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breach of duty on the part of the accountants. 55 Moreover, the court
went on to reject the accountants' contention that no matter how
negligent they might have been, the action was barred by the client's
contributory negligence. 5 In so holding, the court strictly limited the
defense of contributory negligence, stating that the client's negligence
which makes possible the employee's theft does not necessarily excuse
57
the accountants' breach in failing to discover and report the facts.
The court was unwilling to find accountants immune from their
negligence because the client was negligent in conducting the business
for the court noted, accountants "are commonly employed for the
very purpose of detecting defalcations which the employer's negligence has made possible." 58 Contributory negligence might be a defense, the court held, where that negligence has "contributed to the
accountant's failure to perform his contract and to report the truth." 59
Although the result and rationale of National Surety is clearly at
odds with Craig, the National Surety court did attempt to harmonize
its decision with Craig. The National Surety court noted that in
Craig, the embezzler had been "negligently represented to the accountants as a person to be trusted." ' 0 That type of negligence, noted
the court, was not present in National Sureiy.6 1
The continued viability of Craig in New York following National
Surety is at best questionable. The attempt by the National Surety
court to harmonize its decision with Craig does not withstand close
scrutiny. The client in Craig did give the employee in question unfettered control over an entire division of its company. Further, it made
the employee its representative for the purpose of dealing with the
accountants. There is no indication, however, that the plaintiff ever
expressly defended the integrity of the employee to the defendants or
directed the accountants to assume the employee's integrity. This
-1 Id. at 236, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 563-64.
56 Id. at 235, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 236, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 563.

I" Id. This has become known as the National Surety exception. Shapiro v. Glekel, 380 F.
Supp. 1053, 1056 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The National Surety court noted that:
Negligence of the employer is a defense only when it has contributed to the accountant's failure to perform his contract and to report the truth. Thus, by way of
illustration, if it were found that the members of the firm of Halle & Stieglitz had
been negligent in connection with the transfer of funds which occurred at about the
time of each audit and that such negligence contributed to the defendants' false
reports it would be a defense to the action for it could then be said that the
defendants' failure to perform their contracts was attributable, in part at least, to the
negligent conduct of the firm.
256 A.D. at 236, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
00 Id.
81

Id.
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being so, the Craig defendants would, under the National Surety rule,
owe a duty to the plaintiff to investigate the business transactions
conducted by the client's employee since, under the circumstances, the
employee's honesty should not have been assumed. Moreover, the
observation by the Craig court that the embezzler was the client's
representative for purposes of dealing with the accountants seems to
have hardly played a significant role in the Craig court's decision.
One commentator6 2 in discussing both Craig and National Surety
criticized the Craigcase as one based on a "questionable conception of
contract rules respecting remoteness of damage" and presenting a
"curious confusion of tort and contract principles." 6 3 The holding in
National Surety was characterized by Professor Hawkins as "probably . . . the right idea."' 4 He observed that some might argue that if
the tort action were instead one for contract, contributory negligence
would not be a defense and that a different result should not be
reached simply because the action is styled as one in tort.- Although
finding this argument persuasive, Professor Hawkins rejected it as
66
going "too far in trying to establish contract as the basis of duty.
Rather, he reasoned that since contributory negligence is the "failure
to use reasonable care in looking after one's interest" 67 and one of the
reasons an accountant is hired is to protect a client's interests, there is
nothing unreasonable about a client's reliance upon the defendant's
proper performance.6 8 In this situation, the client is conducting his
affairs with the assumption that the defendant will perform properly.
The commentator echoed the holding in National Surety: While contributory negligence must be accepted in theory as being a valid
defense, "it applies only if the plaintiff's conduct goes beyond passive
reliance and actually affects defendant's ability to do his job with
69
reasonable care."

See Hawkins, supra note 4.
Id. at 809-10.
84 Id. at 811.
85 Id. at 810; see Rouse, supra note 33, at 41-42.
88 Hawkins, supra note 4, at 811.
67 Id.
" Id. But as one court has held: "[a]n auditor is not bound to be a detective or to approach
his work with the foregone conclusion that something is wrong. He is a watchdog but not a
bloodhound." In re Kingston Cotton Mills Co., 74 L.T.R. 568, 571 (1895).
The accountant is not an insurer, and does not have an absolute duty to detect discrepancies. His duty is to exercise reasonable care and even the exercise of reasonable care may not
detect every fraud. Indeed, the discovery of defalcations is often described as an accountant's
secondary function. See, e.g., Kurland, Accountant's Legal Liability: Ultramares to Bar Chris,
25 Bus. LAW. 155, 157 (1969).
89 Hawkins, supra note 4, at 811.
82
63
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The National Surety exception, which requires that the plaintiff
must have interfered with the accountant's performance of its contract to be held contributorily negligent, is a rigid one. It would be
inappropriate to strictly apply the National Surety test under certain
circumstances. These circumstances are present when, as was true in
both Craig and InternationalLaboratories,70 the accountants suggest
that the client follow certain procedures which would have prevented
the exact type of theft that later took place. 7' Under National Surety,
if it were determined that the accountants had the responsibility to
discover acts of fraud perpetrated by the client's employees, failure to
implement the accountants' recommendations would not be a defense
since that failure does not interfere with the accountants' performance
of their engagement. If the accountants breach their duty to the client
in not discovering employee fraud, but nevertheless recommend procedures that would prevent further employee fraud and the client
unreasonably fails to heed that advice, some adjustment of the National Surety rule is required.
The conflicting authorities were discussed by a federal district
court in Shapiro v. Glekel. 72 In Shapiro, the plaintiff, a trustee in the
client's bankruptcy, contended that the defendant accountants negligently performed their engagement with the client, thus resulting in
the overstatement of earnings and financial condition, and consequently the client's financial demise. 73 The accountant asserted in
defense the client's contributory negligence, claiming that the client's
two highest officials knew, or should have known, that the client's
financial condition was materially worse than that reflected in the
financial statements prepared by the defendants. 74 After discussing
Craig and National Surety, and noting their conflicting analyses, the
70 In InternationalLaboratories, the client failed to set up a recommended and improved

internal control system. 3 D.L.R. at 666, 41 Man. at 338. Further, the plaintiff had instructed
the auditor to limit the scope of future examinations. Id. at 674, 41 Man. at 331. When the client
sued the auditor for negligence in failing to detect fraud, the court held that contributory
negligence was a valid defense. Id. at 681, 41 Man. at 346; see supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
71 The National Surety court found no evidence to support the proposition that the defendants had ever suggested changing procedures. 256 A.D. at 235, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
72 380 F. Supp. 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
71 Id. at 1054. The trustee argued that the accountants failed to detect errors in the client's
financial reports. Id. The client allegedly relied upon the false reports in making financially
unwise acquisitions. Id. Those acquisitions led to the financial failure and the client's petition for
reorganization under chapter 10 of the Bankruptcy Act. Id.
71 Id. More specifically, the defendant alleged that because the trustee "stands in the shoes"
of the client, the negligence of the client's senior officials precluded recovery by the trustee. Id.
The defendants also argued that their alleged negligence was not the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's losses. Id.
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court, apparently applying New York law, adopted the National Surety rule: Client negligence is only a defense when it contributes to the
failure of the accountant to fulfill his responsibilities. 75 The court
found what it termed significant policy considerations which provided
additional support for this result: Accountants should not be able to
avoid liability for their own negligence absent substantial fault on the
part of the employer "-the Lybrand [National Surety] showing at
least."' 76 Furthermore, the court found the involvement of public
investors and the retainment of the accountants because of their expertise to be important considerations.7 7 Applying the adopted rule, the
court, therefore, found that the conduct of the officials did not interfere with the accountant's performance, and accordingly, denied the
accountant's summary judgment motion.18
A number of other decisions less directly discuss the availability
of the defense of contributory negligence in accountant's malpractice
actions. In Cereal Byproducts Co. v. Hall,79 the accountants were
charged with breach of contract and negligence in performing audits
which did not disclose embezzlements by plaintiff's bookkeeper. 80 The
accountants asserted a defense of contributory negligence. 8 ' The trial
court rejected the accountants' defense but found that they were not
negligent in the performance of the audits. 82 The appellate court
reversed and directed that a finding of negligence be entered against
the accountants.8 3 In doing so, the court also rejected the defense of

" Id. at 1058. In deciding to adopt the National Surety rule, the court adopted Professor
Hawkins' analysis. 380 F. Supp. at 1056-58; see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
76 380 F. Supp. at 1058.
7 Id. The court's reliance on the asserted policy considerations is questionable. The first
"policy," that an accountant should not avoid liability unless the client is guilty of substantial
fault, is conclusory and actually states no policy at all. With respect to the second policy
involving public investors, one wonders why an accountant's liability, in terms of the defense of
contributory negligence, should vary depending upon the extent which the client is a publicly
held company. Moreover, retainment of the accountant because of his expertise does not provide
additional policy support beyond that already stated in National Surety.
" Id. The court also noted that defendants' contention that their negligence was not the
proximate cause of plaintiffs injury was an issue for trial. Id. at 1059.
11 8 IIl. App. 2d 331, 132 N.E.2d 27 (App. Ct. 1956).
80Id. at 333, 132 N.E.2d at 28. In 1943-1946 audits, the accountants, at the request of
plaintiffs management, had not confirmed certain accounts receivable. Id. at 335, 132 N.E.2d
at 29. In the 1947 audit, the accountants were allegedly negligent for failing to confirm certain
accounts at the request of the bookkeeper without proper authorization from management. Id. A
check of those accounts would have disclosed the embezzlement scheme. Id.
81 Id. at 333, 132 N.E.2d at 28. No details of this defense were reported in the decision. See
id.
82 Id.
83 See id.at 336, 132 N.E.2d at 29. The appellate court held that the auditor's acceptance of
the bookkeeper's unconfirmed list of accounts was "inexcusable negligence." Id.; cf. State St.
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contributory negligence. 4 Citing National Surety, the court found
that there were no circumstances indicating that the plaintiff contrib85
uted to the negligence of the defendants in making the audit.
A case that also discusses contributory negligence in accountant's
malpractice actions is Social Security Administration Baltimore Federal Credit Union v. United States.86 In that case, a federal credit
union brought suit against the United States contending that accountants employed by the United States who examined records of the
credit union were negligent in not discovering embezzlements by the
credit union's office manager.8 7 The court found that no breach of
duty by the Government had been established, therefore, the plaintiff
could not recover. 8 8 In addition, the court found that actions by the
credit union "made it difficult for the examiners to do their job
Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 118, 15 N.E.2d 416, 421 (1938) (accountant found negligent
for accepting statement by officer of audited company that accounts were secure); 1136 Tenants'
Corp. v. Max Rothenberg & Co., 36 A.D.2d 804, 805, 319 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1008 (App. Div.
1971), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 585, 281 N.E.2d 846, 330 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1972) (accountant held
negligent for ignoring building manager's missing invoices). But cf. O'Neill v.Atlas Auto. Fin.
Corp., 139 Pa. Super. 346, 351, 356, 11 A.2d 782, 784, 786 (Super. Ct. 1940) (accountants not
negligent in accepting figures from client's bookkeeper without close examination).
84 8 I11. App. 2d at 336, 132 N.E.2d at 29-30.
Cereal Byproducts was cited in Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, [Pamphlet No. 962]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,615 (7th Cir. 1982). In Cenco, a corporation contended that its
auditors were liable for failing to discover a scheme in which the corporation's highest management were participants in inflating inventory. Id. at 93,051. The court denied the claim
primarily on the ground that the wrongdoers were not stealing from the corporation, but rather
had acted to the detriment of outsiders. Id. at 93,056. The court did observe that Illinois, in
Cereal Byproducts, had rejected the position that "employee's fraud is always attributed to the
corporation by the principle of respondeat superior." Id. at 93,054.
85 Curiously, Cereal Byproducts was included by the Shapiro court as being among the
group of cases that "apparently" embraces the Craig rationale. 380 F. Supp. at 1055. Query
whether Cereal Byproducts does not come within the NationalSurety exception. See 256 A.D. at
236, 9 N.Y.S. at 563. The direction from the bookkeeper (who was also a stockholder) not to
confirm certain accounts receivable apparently did interfere with the defendant's performance
App. 2d at 336, 132 N.E.2d at 29. It seems that he was, like the embezzler in
of its exam. 8 I11.
Craig, the person who acted as the company's representative in dealing with the accountants.
86 138 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1956).
87 Id. at 642. The action was brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§
1346(b), 2674 (1976).
The purpose of the inspections was to provide information to the Government; they were
not conducted as a service to the credit union. 138 F. Supp. at 646. Further, the audits were not
performed by certified public accountants. Id. at 643. The inspections performed were superficial, as dictated by the limited resources of the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions. Id. at 643. The
individual credit unions were responsible, under statute, for conducting audits. Id. at 644; see
Federal Credit Union Act, ch. 750, § 11(e), 48 Stat. 1216, 1220-21 (1934) (current version at 12
U.S.C. § 1761(d) (1976)).
11 138 F. Supp. at 661. The court found that there was neither a duty imposed by statute, nor
was one assumed. Id. at 660. The court also found that Government examinations and reports
did not constitute a 'trap" that would decoy credit union officials into neglecting their obligations. Id.
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properly. ' 89 Citing both Craig and National Surety, the court held the
credit union to be contributorily negligent and that this negligence
precluded recovery on the claim.9 °
The court's finding that the action of the credit union interfered
with the Government's examinations is a strained one. The court
would have been on firmer ground had it rested its decision on a
rationale to which it alluded when it noted the credit union's lack of
reliance on the examiner's performance. 9' The reasoning of authorities
which have adopted a narrowing of the usual application of the
contributory negligence defense is that the client has delegated his
duty to the accountant and the accountant cannot complain that the
92
client has not done that which the accountant has undertaken to do.
In Social Security Administration, the delegation of authority never
occurred. The applicable statute placed on the credit union certain
duties which the credit union could not delegate, and which it ignored.9 3 The examinations performed by the Government examiners
were not intended to be a service to the credit union. Further, the
credit union could not reasonably have believed that the examinations
were in fulfillment of the credit union's responsibilities, particularly
when the credit union ignored the examiner's recommendations. So
viewed, Social Security Administration is consistent with those au94
thorities critical of Craig.

89 Id. The credit union officials objected to and ignored Government recommendations. Id.
at 654, 660. Instead, they relied upon the corrupt office manager, holding her out to the
examiners as a trustworthy person. Id.
90 Id. at 661.
The defendant in Shapiro cited Social Security Administration as a case which embraced the
Craig rationale and the Shapiro court apparently agreed. 380 F. Supp. at 1054-55. The Social
Security Administration court's finding that the credit union "made it difficult for the examiners
to do their job properly," however, appears to place the case within the National Surety
exception. 138 F. Supp. at 660; see 256 A.D. at 236, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 563; Hawkins, supra note 4,
at 811. Thus, the Shapiro defendant's reliance on Social Security Administration was probably
misplaced.
1' 138 F. Supp. at 660.
92 See Hawkins, supra note 4, at 800.
93 See supra notes 87 & 90.
94 The court in Shapiro also cited Delmar Vineyard v. Timmons, 486 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1972), as apparently following the Craig rationale. 380 F. Supp. at 1055. In Delmar, it was
contended that the plaintiff sustained financial losses because of audits negligently conducted by
the defendant accountants. 486 S.W.2d at 916. The accountants allegedly understated accounts
payable and overstated inventory. Id. at 915. Plaintiff recovered damages at the trial level and
the defendants appealed. Id. at 916. In reversing the lower court's decision, the appellate court
found that while the accountants had carelessly reported accounts payable, those errors were not
the cause of the plaintiff's losses. Id. at 916-17, 921. The court held that the losses sustained by
the plaintiffs were caused by undercapitalization and the manner of liquidation of inventory
following the closing of the store. Id. at 919. The Delmar court then cited Craig as most closely
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2. The Restatement Approach
For accountant's malpractice actions brought on the theory of
negligent misrepresentation, the Restatement (Second) of Torts95 specifies the type of negligence on the client's part which will be a defense
to such a claim. The Restatement would limit the defense of contributory negligence to unreasonable reliance upon the misrepresentation. 16 Application of that principle in the context of accountant's
malpractice would preclude as a defense the negligence of a client in
managing his business in a way that enables employee fraud to occur.
If the client knew, or should have known, however, that the accountant's examination did not include procedures which would have disclosed the loss, the defense of contributory negligence would be a
valid one. 9 7 In this regard, the Restatement position is not unlike the
position of earlier commentators who analyzed the problem in terms

on point and standing for the proposition that a plaintiff cannot - 'recover for losses which they
could have avoided by the exercise of reasonable care.' " Id. at 920 (quoting Craig, 212 A.D. at
64, 208 N.Y.S. at 268).
It is submitted that the result reached in Delmar was a correct one but that the court erred
in unnecessarily confusing and combining the elements of proximate cause and contributory
negligence. In a case such as Delmar, where it is contended that the client sustained losses
because it conducted its affairs in reliance on erroneous reports supplied by the accountant, the
element of reliance becomes a focal point, and proximate cause can and should be separated
from contributory negligence. See, e.g., Shapiro, 380 F. Supp. at 1058-59.
The court could have simply determined that the erroneous reports supplied by the accountants had no relationship to the course of conduct followed by the client which resulted in the
client's financial demise, and therefore, the element of proximate cause was missing. See Vernon
J. Rockier & Co. v. Glickman, 273 N.W.2d 647, 652 (Minn. 1978) (reliance by plaintiff on
accountant's advice held not to be cause of plaintiff's injury); Kemmerlin v. Wingate, 274 S.C.
62, 63, 261 S.E.2d 50, 51 (1979) (accountant's alleged negligence found not to be proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury).
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) provides in relevant part:

(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for
the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
Id.
Many courts have followed the Restatement approach in connection with an accountant's
negligent misrepresentation. See, e.g., Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz-Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847, 851 (4th Cir. 1972); Bunge Corp. v. Eide, 372 F. Supp.
1058, 1062-63 (D.N.D. 1974); Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 128, 248 N.W.2d 291, 298-99
(1976); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TorTs § 552A provides: "The recipient of a negligent misrepresentation is barred from recovery for pecuniary loss suffered in reliance upon it if he is negligent
in so relying."
" See id.
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of contract, with an emphasis on the element of reliance, and who
characterized negligent reliance as failure to mitigate. 98
III.

THE DEFENSE UNDER NEW JERsEY

LAW

New Jersey courts have been silent as to the defense of contributory negligence in accountant's malpractice cases. The weight of authority favors a National Surety approach to the contributory negligence problem, and the New Jersey courts would probably follow
National Surety. Moreover, expressions of policy by the New Jersey
Supreme Court, although contained in cases far different from accountant's malpractice, strongly suggest that New Jersey, when given

98 Cf. Comment, supra note 27, at 80 (distinguishing contract and negligence actions on
basis of reliance). The Restatement questions the extension of comparative negligence where the
loss is pecuniary as opposed to physical. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552A comment b.
There is no apparent basis for a distinction which depends on the type of harm resulting. In any
event, under the provisions of the New Jersey Comparative Negligence Statute there is no room
to draw the suggested distinction. See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.2 (West Cum. Supp.
1982-1983).
An accountants' negligent misrepresentation to his client, as defined by the Restatement,
was at issue in Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 248 N.W.2d 291 (1976). There, the court
obliquely discussed the issue of contributory negligence although it did not refer in that discussion to the applicable Restatement provision. In Bonhiver, a receiver for an insolvent insurance
company brought an action against the insurance company's accountants. Id. at 116, 248
N.W.2d at 296. The accountants had been hired to update the insurance company's books. Id. at
115, 248 N.W.2d at 295. The accountants had failed to discover that company owners had been
embezzling funds and additionally had negligently made entries which falsely showed the
company to be solvent. Id. State examiners relied upon the entries in allowing the company to
stay in business and the embezzlements continued. Id. The examiners were from the State
Department of Insurance and their reliance on representations of insurance company accountants was standard practice. Id. After insolvency and appointment of a receiver, the receiver
instituted the action against the accountants and was awarded damages. Id. at 111, 248 N.W.2d
at 291. The defendants appealed. Id.
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the contention that the suit was barred by the fraud
of the company's officers noting that the rights of creditors, represented by the receiver, were not
affected by the acts of the former officers. Id. at 118, 248 N.W.2d at 297. The court also
questioned, however, whether "simply" failing to discover the fraud committed by the company's officers would bar the action since the company was the victim and not the perpetrator of
the fraud. Id. Moreover, the court found that the intervening negligence of the Commissioner of
Insurance in not heeding warnings of the insurance company's insolvency was not a bar to the
action. Id. at 118-19, 248 N.W.2d at 297. Under Minnesota law, the court found that to be an
intervening cause, the intervening negligence could not have been caused by the plaintiff. Id. In
the case before it, the court found that the Commissioner had relied on the accountants' entries
and therefore the negligence was not intervening. Id. at 119, 248 N.W.2d at 297. The judgment
of the lower court was therefore affirmed. Id. at 111, 248 N.W.2d at 291.
The preferable approach would have been to analyze the problem of the commissioner's

negligence in the context of the

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 552A. The question would

then be: "Was it reasonable for the Commissioner to rely on the accountants' entries, in light of
the warnings he had received?" See id. Otherwise, blind or foolish reliance, which ought not be
judicially encouraged, would be enough to sustain a cause of action.
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the opportunity to decide the question, will permit only a limited
contributory negligence defense.
One of the cases which suggests how New Jersey courts may rule
on the question is Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corp.,99 in which
the plaintiff sustained personal injuries when his hand was caught in a
punch press manufactured by the defendant. 0 0 It was contended that
the manufacturer was liable under the theories of negligence, breach
of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and strict
liability in not installing particular devices which would have prevented the operator's hand from being caught in the press.' 0' After
finding that sufficient facts existed to raise a question for the jury on
rejected as a matter of law the
the issue of liability, the supreme court
0 2
defense of contributory negligence.1
The court first noted that "in negligence cases, the defense [of
contributory negligence] has been held to be unavailable where considerations of policy and justice dictate." 0 3 The court found that in
the case before it, "interests of justice" precluded the contributory
negligence defense because the asserted contributory negligence of the
plaintiff in permitting his hand to be caught in the press could have
been avoided if the machine had been equipped with the safety device. 0 4 A different ruling would have lead to the anomalous result
that a defendant who had a duty to install the safety device, but
breached that duty, would not be liable in spite of the fact that
05
performance would have prevented injury.1
The defense of contributory negligence was also limited in
Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc. 10 There it was contended that the
defendant tavern owner was liable for negligently serving plaintiff's
decedent alcoholic beverages, resulting in the death of the patron
from injuries sustained in a fall. 0 7 It was contended that the action
was barred by the contributory negligence of plaintiff's decedent in

99 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
Id. at 404, 290 A.2d at 283.

100

101 Id. at 405, 290 A.2d at 282.

Id. at 412, 290 A.2d at 286.
"I Id. The court noted that contributory negligence could in theory be a defense to a strict
liability action, id., but not on the facts before it. Id.
104 Id.
102

105 Id. This, however, is not to say that the defendant will always be barred from asserting a
plaintiff's contributory negligence in a strict liability action against the defendant. Suter v. San
Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 160, 406 A.2d 140, 147 (1979). In Suter, the supreme
court noted that "when the plaintiff has voluntarily and unreasonably proceeded to encounter
the known risk [contributory negligence may exist]." Id.

10646 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d at 630 (1966).
107

Id.

at 584-85, 218 A.2d at 632.
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"getting so intoxicated that he could not take care of himself." 108 This
contention was rejected. Noting that administrative regulations applicable to liquor license holders had been adopted for the protection of
patrons and that in furtherance of the public policy of protection of
the patrons civil tort liability had been imposed on tavern owners, the
court found that to permit the patron's contributory negligence as a
defense would result in the dilution of the accountability imposed on
the tavern keeper. 109 The very aid being afforded would be nullified. 110
The opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Cartel Capital
Corp. v. FirecoI"contains added support for adoption by New Jersey
courts of the National Surety rationale. In Cartel, the plaintiff restaurant sued the retailer-installer-servicer of fire extinguishing equipment
which failed to operate during a fire at plaintiff's restaurant, resulting
in property damage to the restaurant. 112 The claim was based on strict
liability and negligence. The asserted negligence of the plaintiff"13 did
not, the court held, amount to conduct which was sufficient to bar the
strict liability claim. " 4 Because the defendant was found strictly liable
and the conduct of the plaintiff was not sufficient to bar that claim,
the court held that any negligence of the plaintiff was irrelevant.1 5
Nevertheless, the supreme court expressed doubt"" whether the conduct of the plaintiff could, as a matter of law, have been the proximate cause of the damage "since the purpose of the . . . equipment
' 7
was to extinguish a fire on the grill irrespective of its origin."
Although the fire itself may have started as a result of the plaintiff's
negligence, the failure of the extinguisher to operate properly was not
the result of, or influenced by, the plaintiff's negligence.

108 Id.

at 589, 218 A.2d at 634.

109 Id. at 591-92, 218 A.2d at 636.
110 Id. at 592, 218 A.2d at 637.

81 N.J. 548, 410 A.2d 674 (1980).
112 Id. at 553, 410 A.2d at 677. The manufacturer of the equipment was also a party. That

claim, however, was settled at the outset of trial. Id. at 554, 410 A.2d at 677.
113 Id. at 562, 410 A.2d at 681-82. The defendant contended that the plaintiff was negligent
for storing paper plates near a hot grill and for allowing grease to accumulate on the walls and
the grill. Id.
114 Id. at 562-63, 410 A.2d at 681-82. To bar a claim in strict liability, the "defendant must
show that the plaintiff with actual knowledge of the danger posed by the defective product
voluntarily and unreasonably encountered that risk." Id., 410 A.2d at 682. (footnote omitted).
11 Id. at 564-65, 410 A.2d at 683.
" Since the court found the defendant strictly liable, it did not have to consider the effect of
the plaintiffs negligence with respect to the negligence claim. Accordingly, the court's discussion
of the plaintiffs conduct in the context of the negligence claim is dictum.
17 81 N.J. at 562, 410 A.2d at 682.
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Both Bexiga and Cartel cited Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car
Co. 118 It was contended in Bahlman that the construction of an automobile caused plaintiff's injuries. Bahlman sued the defendant, alleging that the latter was liable for damages for breach of warranty in
misrepresenting the safety features built into its vehicle."', The manufacturer asserted plaintiff's contributory negligence in causing the
accident.' 20 The court rejected this defense, finding that although the
accident was caused by the plaintiff's negligence, that negligence was
foreseeable, and the safety features of the car represented by the
manufacturer were not for the purpose of avoiding accidents, but to
lessen the injuries that might result from such accidents.' 2 Since the
manufacturer represented that the construction of the automobile
22
would protect the driver from the consequences of careless driving,
it would be illogical to relieve the manufacturer from liability when
23
the anticipated event occurred.'
Bexiga involved a personal injury claim which occurred in the
work place, so that the nonapplicability of the defense of contributory
negligence may be the product of what seems to be a special policy of
protecting the worker.' 24 Soronen also involved a clear public policy
expressed in administrative regulations. 25 The discussions of contributory negligence as a defense to a negligence claim in Cartel is dictum
2
and probably provides more of a question than an answer.'
Nevertheless, it is submitted that these expressions from the New
Jersey Supreme Court, together with the court's citation of Bahlman,
do contain an expression of policy that contributory negligence will
not be permitted to bar a claim for a loss where a defendant had the
duty to prevent the loss, without regard to whether the origin of the

1

290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939).

"I Id. at 687, 288 N.W. at 310-11.
120Id. at 697, 288 N.W. at 314 (Chandler, J., dissenting).

Id. at 690-91, 288 N.W. at 312.
Id. at 690, 288 N.W. at 311. The court held that the manufacturer in affirmatively
warranting its product "has enlarged his duty beyond that imposed by law, and assumes 'the risk
of injuries proximately caused bysuch misrepresentation.' " Id. at 695, 288 N.W. at 313 (quoting
Curby v. Mastenbrook, 288 Mich. 676, 683, 286 N.W. 123, 126 (1939)).
1 290 Mich. at 697, 288 N.W. at 312-13.
124 Cf. Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 177, 406 A.2d 140, 155
121
122

(1979). Suter was a strict products liability case involving injury to an employee in the work
place. Id. at 154, 406 A.2d at 141. The defendant was alleged to have failed to provide a safety
device on a piece of its machinery. Id., 406 A.2d at 142. The supreme court would not allow the
manufacturer to avoid liability for breach of its duty to prevent injury to those who use the
product. Id. at 168, 406 A.2d at 153.
1' See supra text accompanying note 109.
1"I See supra note 116.
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loss was the plaintiff's negligence.' 27 Applying this policy to cases
alleging accountant's malpractice, New Jersey courts will probably
find that the negligence of a client in failing to discover fraud or in
conducting its business will not bar a claim for malpractice. 2 8 If it is
determined that the accountant had and breached a duty to discover
and expose employee fraud, the accountant will not be permitted to
assert as a defense, the contributory negligence of the client in permitting or failing to discover the very losses which the accountant was
under a duty to prevent. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent
with what appears to be New Jersey's policy of limiting the contributory negligence defense when the defendant has undertaken to prevent a loss anticipating that the loss may occur as a result of the
plaintiff's negligence,
IV.

CONCLUSION

It is submitted that the better reasoned view, and the view
supported by the weight of authorities which have considered the
question, is that the negligence of a client in managing his business
should not generally be a defense in accountant's malpractice actions.
When, however, the conduct of the client is unreasonable under the
circumstances and interferes with the accountant's ability to perform
his duty, that conduct should be a bar, or partial bar (depending on
applicability of comparative negligence concepts) to the cause of
action. In other words, the better rule is that set forth in National
Surety.
The earlier cases like Craig which denied relief to a plaintiff
when the accountant had negligently failed to discover employee
fraud, on the ground that the element of proximate cause was missing,
are clearly wrong. If the accountant discovered the wrong, the employee would have been discharged and future losses would have been
prevented. When the claim made is that as a result of the accountant's
erroneous report, the client took actions which resulted in loss, proximate cause may be more difficult to establish, but the difficulty is
factual and not legal.
The National Surety rationale does require some refinement.
When the accountant negligently fails to discover employee defalca127See supra notes 99 & 124 and accompanying text.
128See Kurland, supra note 68, at 158. There, the author suggests that courts ought to use a
balancing test in determining whether the defense of contributory negligence should be permitted. Id. at 158-59, Kurland does not, however, detail what factors should be considered in the
balancing test he proposes. It is Kurland's opinion that the availability of the defense should be
made on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 159.
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tions, but does advise the client to make certain improvements in his
operations, which if taken would prevent future defalcations, then
strictly speaking the client has not interfered with the accountant's
ability to perform his examination and discovery of the loss. Therefore, that conduct would, under National Surety, not bar a claim
against the accountant. In this situation it would be unfair and unwise
from a policy point of view to visit the entire liability on the accountant when the client could have avoided the loss if it had followed the
accountant's suggestions. 129 Here, the question of the reasonableness
of the client's conduct in the circumstances should be left to the trier of
fact. The factors to be considered by the trier of fact in determining
the reasonableness of the client's conduct should include the utility
and cost of the recommended improvements. The circumstance of the
accountant's failure to discover prior losses, and the client's resulting
perception of the utility of the suggested changes are relevant to the
reasonableness of the client's decision not to implement suggested
improvements. If the client unreasonably does not follow the accountant's suggestions, that failure must still be the proximate cause of the
loss in order to bar recovery by the client. Therefore, if the accountant
has breached his duty over a period of time and during that span of
time several losses occur, only those losses occurring after the client's
unreasonable failure 130 to adopt the accountant's recommendations
would be affected.

121

The rule suggested here, i.e., that the defense of contributory negligence in the sense of

failure to follow the accountant's recommendations, could explain at least in part the results in
Craig, International Laboratories,and Social Security Administration, in that in each of these
cases the client did not follow suggestions which would have prevented or limited the losses.
The refinement suggested here is somewhat analogous to medical malpractice cases in which it
is contended that a patient is contributorily negligent in not following the therapy prescribed by
the physician. It has been held that this type of conduct by the plaintiff, subsequent to the
physician's breach of duty, will not bar a claim but may limit the amount of damages recoverable on a failure to mitigate theory. Flynn v. Stearns, 52 N.J. Super. 115, 145 A.2d 33 (App. Div.
1958).
"0 This would allow the court to give a client a reasonable period of time to implement Wle
suggested changes.

